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Introduction 
It is a well-known fact that the oil-rentier economies are widely exposed to the growth pace of the 
world economy through their heavy dependence on oil exports. It is, therefore, obvious that the 
current global financial and economic crises have an adverse impact on them. The question is, 
however, why the suggested global remedies to the crises are not effective in dealing with the 
main challenges facing these economies. And, why the bail-out packages and the fiscal and 
monetary stimuli taken by the major developed countries do not fit the conditions for sustainable 
economic growth in the oil-exporting developing countries. 
Crude oil, the world’s main energy resource, is invaluable for the world economy as well as for 
the oil-exporting developing economies. However, oil production and prices have always been 
controversial among the producer and the consumer countries. The current, and acute, global 
financial crisis and the economic recession in the major industrial countries have exposed many 
relevant and important phenomena:  
1. First, the similar pattern reflected by the exorbitant expansion of credits in the world’s 
financial and money markets, and the disproportionate spending of the excessive oil 
revenues.  
2. Second, sustainable economic growth is always a function of investment in production 
capacities, but not investment in opaque financial products, or in non-productive white-
elephant projects. It is the lack of real investment opportunities and the inability to 
increase employment accompanied by loose regulations to guide the investment 
corporations for their high-risk deals that promote the speculative practices in financial 
and money markets.  
3. Third, the widening disparity in wealth and income, as manifested by increasing levels of 
poverty, rates of high unemployment, and depletion of natural resources, are not 
sustainable and cannot be resolved by increasing credits, or through the state’s 
temporary and non-institutional distribution of oil-rent.  
Also relevant: the financial and economic crises highlighted the fact that although the involved 
players—the policymakers, beneficiaries, and losers in the mature and the oil-rentier economies 
alike have different economic, social, and political objectives, their economic policies have 
comparable behavior; namely, their inconsistency with the free-market conditions which in turn 
resulted in the apparent waste of resources. The consequences of both the limitless expansion of 
credits and the needless excessive spending of oil revenues have shown the deficiency of 
conventional macroeconomic policies, especially an independent monetary policy, in ensuring 
economic stability and growth.[1] 
The evidence shows that almost all the countries will bear the economic burden of the current 
crises, though in different degrees:[2] the oil-exporting countries are, at present, slipping into 
unfavorable circumstances.[3] This paper attempts to clarify their position vis-à-vis the major 
industrial countries, and highlights their required economic strategy and policies for increasing 
economic growth and lessening their high dependence on oil revenues.[4] Issues related to the 
finance regulations of the banks and investment institutions are beyond the scope of this paper.  
Different Problems Need Different Remedies  
The current global financial and money-market turmoil and the spreading severe economic 
recession highlight the apparent conflict of economic interests and policies of the oil exporters 
and the oil consumers’ countries.[5] In theory, neither the needless spending of the excessive oil 
revenues (production) by the oil-exporting countries, nor the limitless expansion of credit facilities 
given in the major industrial countries satisfies the free market efficiency conditions. In reality, 
however, the prevailing global financial disequilibria as reflected by the trade balance and the 
balance of payments deficits of the largest economies—e.g., the United States, Britain, and the 
EU countries vis-à-vis the surplus of the emerging and the major oil-exporting countries—e.g., 
China, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Norway—[6]cannot be radically remedied by superimposed 
economic and/or political decisions for the reallocation of the available financial resources among 
the countries badly affected by the crises.  
This widely propagated remedy, which is exactly the same old policy of “recycling of oil revenues” 
that followed the increase of oil prices in 1973-1974, advanced by the leaders of the major 
industrial countries through the IMF, is not only violating the state’s sovereignty on 
macroeconomic policy, but also diminishes the benefits of free market competition. In fact, such a 
policy suggestion hides the basic economic factors behind the prevailing crises: namely, the lack 
of real investment, high unemployment, and the low level of private consumption (income).  
However, amidst the ongoing crises, where most countries are suffering, the required global 
coordination of macroeconomic policies and financial assistance to prevent the collapse of the 
world financial and monetary system should be based on relevant regulations and effective 
control of financial and money markets, as well as on sound national macroeconomic policies. 
But such a huge task cannot be performed by carefully drafted, compromised and general 
statements as presented by the recent economic summit of the G20 group.[7] In reality, politics 
cannot be ruled out in the process of developing such cooperation and coordination among the 
concerned countries, but and most importantly, the different economic features and 
circumstances that reflect the stage of development and the availability of resources which 
characterize each of the world economies must be considered.  
The global crises have exposed some important similarities and differences of the credit 
expansion practices in the advanced economies and the excessive spending of oil revenues in 
the oil-rentier economies. Both experiences have had economic irrationalities against the free 
market efficiency conditions. The overwhelming evidence of the credit crisis in the major industrial 
countries, especially the United States, that triggered the global financial and money crisis and 
revealed the economic recession crisis; the continued housing slump, increasing unemployment, 
low consumer confidence, the reduction in household spending, and the steep fall in private 
investment, as well as the economic and fiscal policy experiences of the oil-rentier countries, 
suggest that the conventional policies applied to control macroeconomic events without 
intervening in the firms’ investment decisions in order to sustain stability and growth should be 
changed or modified.  
In industrial countries, the dogmatism of frequent business and economic cycles in the capitalist 
system cannot justify the market failure caused by the irrational decisions taken at the corporation 
(firm) level by their management, and at the macro level by the fiscal and monetary authorities. 
Also, the prevailing market imperfections in the oil-rentier economies—i.e., insufficient physical, 
institutional, and legal infrastructure, scarcity of skilled labor and entrepreneurship, and lack of 
political stability—cannot justify the misuse of the available oil-rent that maintain its high 
dependence on oil sector for sustaining the economic activities and improving living-standard 
indicators without taking into consideration the possible external negative changes in the world oil 
markets. It is, therefore, logical to conclude that the call for a global solution to the prevailing 
global financial and economic crises is not universal and should be qualified by appropriate 
consideration of the distinguished features of the concerned economies.  
The present crises ascertained that the absolute priority of the political authorities in most 
affected mature economies was to save their financial and monetary systems, at any cost, from 
the complete collapse mainly by budget-deficit financing and increasing public domestic and 
external debt, as well as by reallocating the world’s financial resources available to the countries 
that have huge trade and balance-of-payments deficits. In the oil-exporting developing countries, 
the applied fiscal and monetary policies continue to maintain the high level of government 
expenditures and imports financed by excessive oil revenues. These financial measures, claimed 
to be of a short-term nature, appear to the public as necessary and in the right directions, but 
unfortunately it would not root out the causes of the crises. A glance at the rapid deterioration and 
the fast pace of crisis events, and the large changes made to the aims and the magnitude of 
these financial plans and measures undertaken by the fiscal and monetary authorities in the 
United States, Britain, EU countries, and other countries to help the major banks, investment 
institutions, and industries, since the housing credit-mortgage bubble burst in August 2007, 
shows how uncertain it is to maintain macroeconomic stability and events consistent with free-
market efficiency. The reason for such uncertainty is not only that the regulated authorities—i.e., 
the central banks have no exact idea about the size of the credit bubble and the loophole of the 
regulations of the investment corporations, but also they have had no effective instruments to 
regulate the macroeconomic equilibrium at the national level, needless to mention the equilibrium 
at the global level.  
It is significant to recall that by increasing public debt—i.e., using tax payers’ money for financing 
the ailing major banks and industrial companies—the targeted economic stability cannot be 
sustained and economic growth cannot be ensured in the medium- and long-term. Moreover, the 
governments’ intervention that fully and partially nationalized or financially assisted the ailing 
banks to help the business entities in dealing with their credit problems might not be productive in 
the medium- and long-term. In this respect, we should remember the inefficiency “stigma” of the 
public enterprise operations that dominate most of the countries—especially the oil-exporting 
countries—prior to the 1980s and the continuous call for their privatization. Is it not a backward 
economic policy to provide direct assistance to the inefficient banks and industries, or is it a 
genuine need to correct a market failure?  
For the oil-exporting countries, as the oil prices (revenues) decrease as a result of the world’s oil 
demand decline, the pressure on their accumulated foreign currency reserves and financial 
investment in the world financial and money markets will increase, though not in the short-term, 
and the surplus of their balance of payments will quickly decrease. And since their fiscal and 
monetary policies are rather rigid due to the dominance of government expenditures over the 
aggregate “effective” demand and the limited sources of public finance, the social discontent and 
the silent political pressure on the authorities are expected to be considerable in order to maintain 
the present high level of government expenditures. At present, their financial resources and 
flexibility might be enough to avoid serious economic downturn until the point where government 
expenditures decrease substantially and the “hidden economic crisis”—i.e., their high 
dependence on oil revenues—starts to burst. It is unfortunate that the experience of those 
countries show that only in time of severe financial crises, the call for realizing the risk of high 
dependence on the oil sector gains some attention from the concerned political authorities. If the 
pressure of the world economic recession increases, the fiscal and monetary policies in these 
countries should, therefore, be changed in line with the long-time advocated radical structural 
reforms, which necessitate the state action to influence the economic growth path through 
relevant macroeconomic policies, especially investment in infrastructure and strategic 
industries.[8]  
The Global Financial and Economic Crises: Violation of Free Market Basics  
The policymakers, like the professional economists, are practical people, but under heavy political 
and social-discontent pressures, they tend to act far beyond the economic rationalities. The 
justifications for the financial support given by many governments to save the ailing major banks, 
investment institutions, and industries have twisted the argument on the causes and remedies of 
the financial and economic recession crises in the major mature economies, apart from the 
explanation that preserve the indigenous conditions of economic growth and employment in a 
free market. As summarized by the world’s major economies (the G20), their efforts to alleviate 
the prevailing global financial and liquidity problems showed that there were no unified or 
consistent macroeconomic policies for dealing with the prevailing problems except the call for 
structural reforms of the global financial system and tightening the credit regulations. Even with 
the identification of the crises’ causes, the G20 have considered all factors on the same level of 
importance—i.e., the inadequate appreciation of the risks by market participants, weak 
underwriting standards, unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex and opaque 
products—and the policymakers, the regulators, and supervisors, in some advanced countries, 
did not adequately appreciate and address the risks building up in the financial markets.[9] Also, 
the G20 confirm that the major underlying factors were, among others, inconsistent and 
insufficiently coordinated macroeconomic policies, inadequate structural reforms, which led to 
unsustainable global macroeconomic outcomes.[10] Prior to the G20 summit conclusions, the 
economic and financial authorities in the United States have identified the collapse of the housing 
market, in particular, as the main cause of the financial and money market crisis and, therefore, 
they assumed that the remedy should begin with financial stimulus to this sector.[11] More 
importantly, the financial support packages introduced by Britain, the United States, and the EU 
countries in the form of full and partial nationalization and bail-out of the ailing major banks, 
investment institutions, and industries, as well as bad debt, were in clear contrast to the 
conventional macroeconomic policies that have been applied for a long time by the major 
developed countries and rigorously imposed, through the IMF, on the developing countries, 
including the oil-exporting countries, as part of liberalization reform of their markets. However, 
although these urgent practical measures have been temporarily essential for avoiding the 
complete collapse of the national and global financial and monetary systems, they fell short of 
dealing with the real factors of the crises, if not planting the seeds for long-term structural 
problems. For example, the apparent high increase of public debt and the reduction of interest 
rates in Britain led to a sharp devaluation of the foreign exchange value of the GBP (British 
Pound) which would not ease its economic recession in the longer-term. In fact, such analysis 
has dominated the IMF doctrines for a long time. It is relevant, in this respect, to note the IMF has 
not observed the need to reduce the annual budget deficit, or the trade- and balance of payments 
deficit of the U.S. economy, the world’s largest economy.[12]  
Indeed, while investment is always the engine of economic growth and employment, the wide use 
of money and financial resources as instruments in speculative future dealings through the 
shares, bonds, commodities, derivatives, hedge funds, and other financial products, generate 
financial bubbles rather than allocate the expansion of real production capacities. In addition, the 
macroeconomic environment, where housing prices were increasing, encouraged home owners 
to extend their home-mortgage credits regardless of their ability for future repayment, have 
generated the housing bubble. These are the reasons for the market failure that were behind the 
fundamental factor of the prevailing crises—i.e., the supply of goods and services fell short of 
aggregate demand, which was promoted by non-qualified credit. In other words, the huge 
expansion of credits for financing the “anticipated” high-return investment in the financial and 
money markets that are widely integrated at global level has not been sufficient to finance the 
expansion of production capacities. The symptom of this problem was very clear from the fact 
that during the 2003-2007 period, the average rate of world economic growth was estimated at 
about 3.6%,[13] while most of the financial markets’ indices have grown annually at more than 
many times GDP growth rates. Such facts that characterized economic development in most 
countries leave no doubt that a financial bubble was developing and sustained by the false belief 
of the speculators in future price rises. This phenomenon hides the fundamental cause of the 
market failure—i.e., the increasingly divergent gap between the flow of goods that are 
constrained by physical and management production capacities, and the flow of money and 
credits that were expanding fast without proper restriction. 
Amazingly, since 2001, there have been rigorous efforts on the part of the economic authorities 
responsible for fiscal and monetary policies as well as the banks and financial institutions in the 
major industrial and emerging economies for promoting consumer demand by credit as the main 
stimulus for increasing economic growth and employment. This is correct—increasing demand is 
a necessary but not sufficient—growth condition. Moreover, encouraging investment through the 
reduction of interest rates might work as a disincentive for stimulating savings for investment. The 
assumption that by putting your money in the financial market would have a better return must be 
qualified by the real increase of the production capacities of related industries. The provision of 
money liquidity needed for credit expansion in financial and money markets should be 
constrained by the actual industrial performance, not the profit generated by increasing the 
assets’ prices for the banks and companies through mere speculative trading in the stock markets. 
Also, the applied policy for reducing the cost of economic activities by depressing wages to the 
minimum subsistence level would not increase the effective demand that stimulates growth.  
Given the huge size of the financial bubble—e.g., the value of the world stock markets was 
estimated at about $36.6 trillion, and the value of global derivatives was estimated at about 
$480.0 trillion, or some twelve times of the value of the world GDP[14]—the increasing money 
liquidity and recapitalization of the ailing banks, investment institutions, and industries through the 
bail-out packages that were financed by increasing the deficits of public finance, as experienced 
by the major industrial countries, can only alleviate the liquidity problem in the short-run, but not 
prevent economic recession. It is obvious that when the assets of the banks and the industrial 
companies substantially devalued, and the banks’ ability to provide credits substantially 
decreased, there will be sharp reduction in its activities, as well as the activities of other industries, 
and consequently leads to cutting the number of their employees. The fast fall of the major 
industrial economies into a recession-trap ascertains the basic economic proposition that the 
increase of effective demand can only be determined by increasing real income generated by the 
expansion of production capacities and wages, but not through the overvalued prices of the 
“future” products traded in the world financial and money markets. This phenomenon was 
manifested in the dynamics of the expansion of home mortgage loans, especially the sub-prime 
mortgage, and the resulting high increase (overvalued) of houses and properties’ prices, which in 
turn encouraged the home owners to remortgage their properties and use the value difference for 
increasing their consumption. Indeed, with the nearly unlimited credit facilities, people have 
consumed their non-realized “future income.” Hence, the huge amount of credits that were not 
allocated for financing real investment have created the illusion of a possible increase in the value 
of the traded products, commodities, and money from mere speculation. This simply means a 
violation of the basic principle of economics—i.e., investment creates tangible products and the 
value of the latter is determined by the cost of production and the utility of the consumers. 
Undoubtedly, creating value out of nothing (speculation) is an economic paradox. It is true that 
the supply and demand imbalances, as the free market advocates insist, would be settled by the 
free market built-in mechanism, but it is also true that for reaching the new “lower” equilibrium as 
in the present case, there is a cost to pay. Indeed, the world is still paying a heavy financial and 
economic cost for alleviating the internal and external financial and economic imbalances.  
The Dynamics of Oil-Rentier Economies  
In theory, under the ideal perfect free competition conditions, the price mechanism would lead to 
efficient allocation of resources—i.e., economic efficiency can be achieved by the market without 
the state’s intervention. In reality, however, the function of the price mechanism is affected by the 
macroeconomic events where the state’s policies, and less important the private firms’ decisions, 
can influence it. Indeed, none of the successful economic development experience in the world 
avoided the essential economic role of the state.[15] In particular, the social dimensions of the 
economic activities necessitate an active role by the state in order to maintain social justice in the 
distribution of economic development benefits among the citizens. Also in theory, the excessive 
economic-rent (revenues) of oil exports violates the principles of free market in two aspects; first, 
it generates significant economic and financial surplus from outside the normal non-oil production 
activities at a very low cost without the possibility of having new competitive investments in the oil 
production industry; and secondly, there is no economic need for increasing oil production 
(exports) while oil demand and prices are increasing. As a consequence, excessive and 
continuous public spending of the abundant oil revenues in an economy of limited absorptive 
capacity create the dynamics that aggravate the existing structural economic problems; namely, 
increasing the high dependence of the economy on oil.[16]  
Under these conditions, the question is; do we have an efficient model for the functioning of the 
oil-rentier economy? Or, to put it in practical terms, is there an effective applicable strategy and 
policies for transferring the oil-rentier economy to a competitive free market one that sustains 
economic growth and employment?  
Experience showed that the obstacles which impede the liberalization of the oil-rentier economy 
and hinder its growth lie in the state’s high dependence on oil revenues (exports) for financing the 
high level of government expenditures; consumption and investment in infrastructure, and for 
increasing imports.[17] In an economy with limited absorptive capacity, such a high level of 
effective demand creates a high level of money liquidity and inflationary pressures. Parallel to this 
pattern of activities, the citizens’ dependence on the state increases for maintaining their income 
through employment in government departments and public enterprises, as well as calling for 
maintaining government expenditures on public basic services. Also, public expenditures for the 
erection of the required physical infrastructure and its costly maintenance would sustain the high 
dependence of the private businesses and the people alike on the state’s oil money. As time 
passes on, the interrelated upward-trend dynamics of the state and the citizens’ high dependence 
on oil revenues have resulted in two important socio-political features; first, the ruling authorities 
realize and exploit the fact that as long as people and the private sector are paying little or no 
taxes and non-oil exports contribute little to finance imports, then there is no need for them to 
participate actively in the state’s economic and political decision-making processes—i.e., the 
political and economic role of the citizens and private sector becomes marginal. Secondly, in 
order to maintain their income and improve their living standard, the citizens always raise their 
concern and repeat their demand for creating new work opportunities despite of the dire need for 
increasing labor productivity, and expanding public services. Similarly, the indigenous private 
sector and business community increases continuously the pressure for more government 
expenditures on infrastructure and public buildings and construction works, where profit is 
secured compared to the risk of investment in non-oil industrial and agriculture activities.  
The vicious circle of high dependence of the state and the citizens on the oil revenues is 
deepening further by the exerted external pressure for increasing oil production (exports) and the 
IMF’s and the World Bank’s continuous demand for increasing the spending of the excessive oil 
revenues through the annual budget, imports, and investment in foreign financial institutions and 
international corporations. It was an apparent biased policy that the IMF and World Bank gave 
priority to alleviate the world’s financial problems by maintaining the supply and demand 
equilibrium at a global level rather than satisfying the interests of the oil-producing developing 
countries.[18]  
These developments have always resulted in a continuous increase in economic activities at a 
higher level of prices, but not necessarily a parallel lead to the expansion of the non-oil industrial 
production capacities. It did not generate new income (production) and saving (investment) 
sources. Indeed, excessive spending of oil revenues reduces labor and capital productivity and, 
thus, the economic competitiveness criteria are not satisfied.  
The Global Crises and the Economic Policies of the Oil-Rentier Countries  
Despite their financial losses in the domestic and world financial and money markets, the oil-
exporting countries are still enjoying their abundant financial resources available in the “state 
sovereign fund” and foreign currency reserves that are sufficient to maintain their high level of 
domestic aggregate demand and the required imports for at least two years in the case of the 
major oil-exporting countries.[19] Most important, however, it is essential to emphasize that their 
serious economic problems cannot be rooted out by temporary fiscal and monetary measures as 
widely advised by the IMF.  
Since the 1950s, the major oil-exporting developing countries have increased their dependence 
on oil revenues and have developed a structural problem: the hidden economic crisis. In those 
countries, it was quite right and fully justifiable at the early stages of their socio-economic 
development to maximize and utilize oil revenues in financing their badly needed physical 
infrastructure projects and the provision of public education, health, and social services. However, 
as those economies grew over the last few decades and peoples’ living standards substantially 
improved, the state’s reliance on oil revenues increased to the extent that the economy becomes 
more sensitive to the external economic and political fluctuations. Equally important, the 
economic reliance of the people on the state has also increased to the level where the state’s 
macroeconomic fiscal and monetary policies are restrained by peoples’ increasing economic, 
social, and political demands. The major economic players behind these developments, the 
government and the indigenous and foreign investors, have failed to expand and diversify the 
industrial production activities and generate new national income sources enough to ensure 
economic stability and growth against any significant fluctuations in the world’s demand for crude 
oil. The actual experiences show, in particular, that inefficient public enterprises have failed to 
generate enough financial and economic surpluses, and thus encouraged the state to embark on 
a privatization program. Parallel to this, the activities of the private sector have concentrated on 
trade and construction sectors, but not investment in industry, except for investment in the crude 
oil industry, which is monopolized by the state. This investment failure was mainly due to 
ineffective macroeconomic policies, lack of skilled manpower, inadequate infrastructure, the 
limitation of the legal institutions and commercial laws and regulations, severe political problems, 
and partly due to inefficient indigenous entrepreneurship. The latter is a significant factor that was 
behind the rush of the indigenous business communities and the government and public 
enterprises to invest their abundant financial resources in the domestic and world financial and 
money markets and properties, which have had the adverse consequences of the current global 
crises.  
As the actual experience proved and theoretically analyzed, the extreme situation that these 
countries might face—i.e., a huge and sudden reduction in oil export revenues—shows a sharp 
fall in domestic economic activities and the real (shadow) prices of oil resources, as reflected by 
the foreign exchange of the currency, drop fast. The resulting big decrease of the state’s financial 
resources, especially foreign currency, will constitute a very heavy constraint on government 
expenditures and imports that are required for maintaining consumption, investment, and 
provision of raw materials for production. Consequently, the living standards will substantially 
deteriorate.[20] The impact of the current global crises, however, is much less than nearing the 
extreme economic collapse scenario since the countries have enough financial resources.[21] Oil 
revenues are still coming from exports, though less in value, and the governments try to adhere 
to its budget expenditures, especially for unnecessary public projects, and public enterprises as 
well as private enterprises hold the implementation of their new investment projects. Even traders 
started to cut their luxury and non-essential imports. So far, in addition to the huge drop in the 
values of shares in the domestic and world stock markets and properties, the short-term impact of 
the global crises has been in decreasing national consumption and imports. However, the actual 
reduction in economic activities has resulted in a noticeable increase in unemployment, and 
under-utilization of production capacities and resources. All normal assumptions regarding the 
values and behavior of economic variables and parameters that characterized the oil boom during 
the last three years become less relevant.[22] Socially, if the current events continue, it will 
eventually lead to widespread popular discontent, increase poverty, and political instability. The 
symptoms of the economic hidden crisis gradually become apparent, and the crises show the 
gravity of neglecting the required policies and reforms to increase production of non-oil sectors, 
non-oil exports, non-oil financial sources of public finance, and increasing the share of private 
sector to GDP.  
In response to the current global financial and economic crises, the immediate concern of the 
economic authorities must focus on the following:  
• A better coordination of the fiscal and monetary policies and credit regulation measures 
are urgently needed in the short-term. Also, an Early Warning System is required to 
monitor the money liquidity situation, credit expansion, and the capital base of the banks 
and investment institutions. Similarly, a short-term economic forecast model is required 
for reviewing the growth rates by government macroeconomic planning authorities.  
• In the medium-term, it is required to continue the implementation of the development 
projects, especially the physical, social, and environmental infrastructure of national 
development plans and programs. Such continuation will benefit from the likely decrease 
in prices of imported products, commodities, raw materials, and imported technology. It 
would also maintain the domestic non-oil production and economic activities.  
• For the medium and long-term, the strategy of economic diversification—i.e., reducing 
the economy’s high dependence on oil revenues for maintaining public investment and 
government expenditures and financing imports, should rigorously be implemented. Clear 
criteria for monitoring the progress in implementing this strategy should be introduced 
and politically committed by the state.  
Conclusions  
Economic globalization has not changed the basics of economics where investment is the engine 
of growth; but investment means the expansion of production capacities, not the speculative 
finance in the future prices of products, commodities, and money. Also, sustainable economic 
growth cannot be achieved by increasing demand through unlimited credits in financial and 
money markets.  
The current global and economic crises have changed the conventional assumptions related to 
the role of the state fiscal and monetary policies in regulating the macroeconomic events in 
consistency with the firm (micro) activities, but not the basic conditions of the free market 
competition that lead to efficient allocation of resources—i.e., economic growth. However, the 
different causes of the credit crisis and the associated financial and money markets, and the 
economic recession crisis in the major developed countries and their adverse impact extending to 
the world economy beyond 2009 on the oil-exporting economies, suggest that the political notion 
that “global financial and economic problems need global solutions” has neither concrete 
economic justification, nor practical viability.[23] 
The current global crisis has exposed the deficiency of the common macroeconomic policies, 
especially the independent monetary policy in maintaining economic stability and growth as 
reflected by the unprecedented state intervention of the major developed countries to provide 
liquidity and financial assistance through bail-outs for the ailing banks and industries by annual 
budget deficit-finance and increasing public debt, and also to stimulate the economy by boosting 
consumer spending and restoring confidence in the business and banking sector. Though not 
related to the current global financial crisis, the macroeconomic policies undertaken by the oil-
exporting countries; namely, the excessive government’s spending of oil revenues and 
investment in the domestic and the world financial and money markets, have failed to improve 
their economic position against the sharp drop in oil revenues. However, the different causes and 
remedies of the current crises shows that the prospects for having unified global macroeconomic 
policies to regulate the global financial system, as envisaged by the major developed countries, is 
beyond reach.  
While the irrationality of the fiscal and monetary policies in the developed industrial countries 
resulted in huge problems of money liquidity, recapitalization of the banks and investment 
institutions, the need for credit regulations and monitoring of the global financial and monetary 
system, the oil-exporting developing countries are still facing the dire need for the expansion of 
production capacities and undertaking radical economic structural reforms—i.e., increasing 
investment in indigenous industries and encouraging the indigenization of foreign investment, 
especially the highly advanced technologies, and reducing the high dependence on oil revenues 
in financing the government expenditures and imports. Only by these policies will the risk of the 
hidden economic crisis be diminished. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
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